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GOVERNMENT RISK PREMIUMS IN THE BOND MARKET

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper investigates the risk premiums paid by central and sub-central governments in the European Union and by Canadian provinces for borrowing in the bond market. According to the market-discipline hypothesis, bond yield spreads over an appropriate benchmark bond signal the financial markets' assessment of the sustainability of a government's fiscal policy. Weak fiscal discipline and rising credit risk should be reflected in higher costs of borrowing of the government concerned compared to the benchmark. This mechanism may be especially important in a monetary union such as the European Monetary Union (EMU), where national governments no longer have the possibility to monetize and inflate away excessive debts. However, risk premiums may be much smaller or even absent in a monetary union, if the markets anticipate that troubled governments can turn to other member states of the union or the central bank for a bail-out. Thus, empirical evidence for risk premiums in the EMU reflects the credibility of the "no bail-out clause" in the Maastricht Treaty.
This paper deals with bonds issued by central and sub-national governments. Using
German federal government bonds and US Treasury bonds as the benchmarks, we first focus on risk premiums paid by other central governments in EMU on bonds denominated in either DM or Euros or US dollars. Next, we turn to the risk premiums paid by sub-central governments in Germany and Spain. Sub-central governments should be expected to pay larger risk premiums than central governments, since they have smaller and more mobile tax bases than central governments and, therefore, are more risky borrowers. Thus, finding that the yield spreads we observe for sub-central governments respond more strongly to measures of fiscal performance than those observed for central governments strengthens the interpretation of these spreads as risk premiums.
An interesting and important of the German federal system is that German states, following a ruling by the Constitutional Court, can expect financial help from the federal government if they find themselves in deep financial troubles. Given such bail-out expectations, German states should not pay risk premiums over the German federal government. This may have changed with the advent of EMU, however, as the federal government is now restricted in its borrowing capacity by the fiscal rules of EMU, and may be limited its ability to deal with state fiscal crises.
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A second, interesting feature of German federalism is that all states participate in the German fiscal equalization system which guarantees all states a minimum level of annual tax revenues. In practice, the minimum is very close to the average and some states are permanent net recipients while others are permanent net contributors. Fiscal equalization may also affect the markets' perception of a sub-central government's credit risk, as the central government may find it hard to refuse bail-outs to states which are permanent net recipient of equalization grants. In view of this, we ask whether a state's net position in the equalization scheme affects the risk premium it pays on its bonds. Since Canada has a similar equalization scheme, we also use Canadian data to ask a similar question regarding provincial borrowing.
The econometric analysis in the paper covers the period 1991-2005. Interest rate spreads over central government bonds expressed in DM/euro, US dollar and Canadian dollar are regressed on a number of variables including the levels of fiscal balances and public debt. We also control for the maturity of debt, and for general investors' risk aversion. Possible changes in relationships related to the introduction of the euro in 1999 are taken into account, not only by including separate EMU dummies, but also by interacting these with the fiscal variables, to detect changes in interest rate responses to government balances and debt.
The empirical results indicate than central governments of EMU member states paid significant risk premiums related to their fiscal performance before the start of EMU in 1999 and continue to do so after the start of EMU. This indicates that the "no-bail-out clause" enjoys some credibility in the markets. Next, we find that, before the start of EMU, German regions, and, in particular, those that were consistently net recipients in the German equalization scheme, did not pay risk premiums related to their fiscal performance in excess of the German federal government. In contrast, net contributors to fiscal equalization and Spanish provinces did pay such premiums. After the start of EMU, however, the more favourable treatment of the former in the credit market vanished. This indicates that EMU may have affected Germany's position in the European debt market as well, possibly due to the reduced capacity of Germany to borrow and print its own money in EMU.
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March 2008 Turning to Canada, we find that provincial governments pay a significant risk premium related to their fiscal performance unless they belong to the group of net recipients under Canadian fiscal equalization. Together with the results for Germany, this suggests that, beyond their principal function of reducing inequalities within a federation, fiscal equalization schemes affect the credit risk of sub-central governments and, therefore, allow recipient states to borrow at more favourable terms than others.
Introduction
The potential effect of credit risk on government bond yields is an important issue for economists and policy makers alike. By charging risk premiums on bond yields that increase with government debt or deficits, financial markets can penalize governments for a lack of fiscal discipline, thus imposing discipline on them. Government bond yields would then be signals of the markets' assessment of the sustainability of fiscal policy.
Market-imposed discipline of this kind is especially relevant in large federal states, such In light of this, the existence of default risk premiums in sovereign bond yields has received a lot of attention in the debate over monetary union in Europe; see Bernoth et al. (2006) for a review of the literature. One way to detect and estimate such risk premiums is by considering the yield spreads of government bonds relative to a suitable benchmark. Following this approach, Goldstein and Woglom (1992) , Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) , and Poterba and Rueben (1997) show that state governments in the US pay risk premiums on their debt and that these premiums depend on indicators of fiscal performance. Lemmen (1999) shows that the yield spreads of bonds issued by state governments in Australia, Canada, and Germany over central government bond yields depend positively on the ratio of state debt to GDP.
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2 Lonning (2000) compares the yields of a very small sample of DM issues of 11 EU governments with equivalent German government bonds in the mid-1990s and finds a positive, though not always significant impact of government debt and deficits.
Gómez-Puig (2006) uses adjusted spreads of the yields on bonds issued by 10
European countries over DM bonds, where the adjustment uses appropriate swap rates to eliminate exchange rate uncertainty. She finds that the spreads increase with increasing debt relative to Germany. 3 Pagano and von Thadden (2004) show that average yield differentials of 10-year bonds issued by EMU member state governments relative to German 10-year bonds are positively correlated with bond ratings. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2007) show that spreads in euro area countries are systematically related to credit ratings, whereas Afonso et al (2007) provide evidence that ratings are also driven by budgetary developments.
In a recent paper, Bernoth et al. (2006) analyze the spreads of yields-at-issue of sovereign bonds issued by EU central governments in DM (in Euros after 1999) or US dollars to estimate default risk premiums. The use of DM (Euro) and USD denominated bonds avoids the problems of exchange rate risk and different tax treatments that have plagued earlier studies using yields on bonds denominated in national currencies.
Looking at yields-at-issue assures the comparability of yields at different points in time, since, in contrast to average yields on debt outstanding, the residual maturity is always the full maturity and the bonds are actively traded on the day when the yields are recorded. Bernoth et al. use data from before and after the start of EMU, allowing them to assess the impact of monetary union on bond yield spreads. Their results show that yield spreads respond significantly to measures of general government debt and deficits both before and after the start of EMU. This indicates that sovereign debt markets 2 Balassone et al. (2004) show that yields spreads against Germany of government bonds issued by the other EU countries in their national currencies between 1980 and 2003 depend positively on the change in the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Using issues in national currencies, however, they cannot distinguish between credit risk and exchange rate risk, which distinction is no longer relevant in EMU. 3 Alesina, De Broeck, Prati and Tabellini (1992) use data from 12 OECD countries and show that the differential between public and private bond yields is positively related to the level of public debt. In a similar vein, Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) and Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) show that the differential between government bond yields and the corresponding swap yield of the same maturity depends positively on the level of public debt, while Heppke-Falk and Hüffner (2004) find that expected deficits have a positive impact on this differential in Germany, France, and Italy. It is not clear, however, that this differential properly reflects sovereign risk, since the credit risk of private issuers is likely to be correlated with the credit risk of their governments. See also Afonso and Strauch (2003) and Faini (2004) . The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our empirical approach for estimating risk premiums. In section 3, we present the data and estimation approach. In section 4, we report the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Risk Premiums in Government Bond Yields
Consider a risk-averse investor choosing between two securities issued by two different governments, the "domestic" and the "foreign" government for simplicity, in the same currency. The investor's rate of return on a security depends positively on the expected yield and negatively on the expected transaction cost the investor incurs, if, because of unforeseen circumstances, he has to sell the security before it matures. We assume that the expected transactions cost is proportional to the value of the security and a declining function of the liquidity of the security in the market. Taking the security issued by the foreign government as the benchmark in the market, we normalize the transactions costs related to it to zero.
We assume that the domestic security is subject to (partial) default risk, while the foreign asset is considered risk-free. More specifically, the domestic government will be unable to fully serve its obligations with a positive probability of 1-P(x t ), 0 P(x t ) 1. Here,
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March 2008 x t indicates a set of variables affecting this probability. In the case of partial default, the investor receives a fraction of his gross payment, [0, 1 + r), where r is the interest rate on the domestic bond. Standard portfolio theory implies that the optimal amount invested in the domestic security depends positively on the yield on the domestic security, and negatively on the foreign yield, the domestic government's default probability, a liquidity premium, and the investor's risk premium. Furthermore, as Bernoth et al (2006) show, for a given supply of securities in the market, the equilibrium yield spread of the domestic over the foreign security depends positively on the domestic government's default probability, the liquidity premium on the domestic security, the investor's degree of risk aversion, and the variance of the government's stochastic default process.
These considerations lead to the following reduced form equation for the yield spread, which will be the basis for our empirical analysis:
The left-hand side variable is the yield differential between the domestic and the foreign security. The first term on the right-hand side reflects the yield premium over the benchmark due to the partial default risk. Given the expected repayment in the case of default, (1-t /(1+r t )), it increases with the probability of default, (1-P(x t )). The second term reflects the liquidity premium. The third term stems from the investor's risk aversion and depends on the variance of the return on the domestic security.
In order to derive an equation that can be estimated empirically, we need empirical proxies of the variables on the right hand side. The main hypothesis of interest in this paper is that the yield differential can be explained by indicators of fiscal performance relating to a government's probability of default. Following the literature, we use two variables for this purpose, the ratio of government debt to GDP and the ratio of the government budget surplus to GDP. 7 They are measured as differences relative to the benchmark country. We expect that both affect the yield differential positively.
To approximate the liquidity premium, we cannot follow the conventional approach of using bid-ask spreads as a measure of trading costs in securities markets (Fleming, 2003 day of trading. Gravelle (1999) shows that the correlation between bid-ask spreads and the total supply of debt is significantly negative. This suggests that the size of the market for a given security has a positive effect on its liquidity. Bernoth et al. (2006) use the ratio of the total debt of the issuer country denominated in the currency under consideration as a proxy for market size. Since these data are not available for all subnational governments under consideration in this study, we use the size of a debt issue as a proxy for its liquidity. In addition, liquidity effects may be captured by the inclusion of dummies reflecting whether the issuer is a central or a regional government.
The impact of general investors' risk aversion on yield spreads between countries suggested by equation (1) is supported by empirical observations. Dungey et al. (2000) show strong evidence of a common international factor in many yield differentials.
Copeland and Jones (2001) note that interest rate differentials between EMU member countries widened in periods of financial crises such as the Russian crisis in 1998 or the Turkish currency crisis in 2001. Similarly, Lemmen (1999) observes that the difference between provincial and federal yields in Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US widened considerably after the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian default of August 1998. Thus, it seems that in periods of global financial crises or greater uncertainty investors move to safer and more liquid assets and that bond yield spreads increase as a result.
Since investors' risk aversion is not directly observable, we follow Codogno et al. (2003) , Favero and Giavazzi (2004) , and Bernoth et al (2006) and use the yield spread between low grade US corporate bonds (BBB) and benchmark US government bonds as an empirical proxy for global risk aversion. are generally low compared to short-term rates, investors ask for lower risk premiums as they are eager to find investment opportunities offering attractive spreads over shortterm interest rates. This suggests including a short-term interest rate or the spread between a long-term and a short-term interest rate in the relevant currency market as additional proxies for investors' risk aversion.
Furthermore, we include the time to maturity of the bonds at the time of issue as additional control related to the investors' risk premium, since our sample contains issues of different maturities. It controls for the possibility that investors receive a compensation for investing in long-term bonds instead of buying short-term bonds and rolling them over. This yields the following model:
. 1
In equation (2), 0 and are scalar parameters and 1 is a vector of parameters. r it is the yield at issue of a security issued by government i at time t and r jt the yield at issue of a security issued by the benchmark government j at the same time. z it is a vector containing the fiscal indicators, our measure of issue size, the short-term interest rate, and the years to maturity. The variable s t is the corporate spread from figure 1. Finally, ijt is a stochastic error term.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the yield spreads on sub-national government debt. There is a number of reasons why sub-national governments may pay risk premiums in excess of those paid by central governments. First, their tax capacity is typically smaller than that of central governments, as central governments usually own the revenues from the most important taxes, such as income taxes and VAT. Even if sub-national governments own (shares) of these taxes, they may, as in Germany, be restricted in their authority to change tax rates and, therefore, in their ability to react to revenue and spending shocks. Second, sub-national governments face a much more mobile tax base for most taxes except real estate taxes, which further restricts their ability to raise additional revenues in case of fiscal crises. considerations suggest that sub-national governments should pay larger risk premiums than central governments.
At the same time, there may also be risk-alleviating effects in favor of sub-central governments. The first is an (explicit or implicit) commitment of the central government to bail out sub-national governments in fiscal crises. If such a commitment exists, a subnational government should pay the same risk premium as its central government. In addition, Germany and Canada have explicit mechanisms of fiscal equalization, i.e., arrangements for sharing tax revenues among the states or provinces. Such arrangements provide some insurance against state or province-specific shocks. Since, in these two countries, there are some states which always receive transfers through these systems and others which always pay in, one may expect that the risk-alleviating function is particularly important for those which are always net recipients.
In view of these considerations, we include in equation (2) use national monetary policies to inflate away excessive debts. 9 This should increase the credit risk of central governments in EMU. However, euro-denominated debt is different from foreign-currency debt in that the government of a EMU member state receives its tax revenues in euros, i.e., the same currency its obligations are denominated in. In national currency systems, fiscal crises typically come with large devaluations of the domestic currency. This implies that it is even harder for a government hit by a crises to serve its foreign-currency obligations, which adds to the risk of default. Since this adverse exchange rate effect vanishes in EMU, the riskpremium on euro-denominated debt may also be lower than the premium on foreigncurrency debt before EMU. Finally, financial markets may well perceive that governments of EMU member states faced with fiscal crises would receive financial assistance from other EMU member states or the ECB, as a default of a member state government might damage the euro-area financial system and the international reputation of the common currency. 10 Such a perception would also tend to reduce the risk premium on government debt.
The second implication of the conversion of all public debt into euros concerns the liquidity of securities markets, as a common currency increases the substitutability of government bonds of different countries and, hence, market size. This should lead to a decline in liquidity premiums. This is consistent with the evidence for interest rate convergence in the market for public debt in the euro area, see, e.g., Pagano and von Thadden (2004) .
In sum, the effects of EMU on the yield spreads on government bonds are ambiguous and deserve empirical analysis. 11 To investigate them, we augment our model as follows: In equation (4), EMU is a dummy variable which is one for EMU member states after 1998 and zero otherwise. The coefficient 0 indicates the effect of EMU on the level of the yield spread, while the coefficients 1 indicate any changes in the slope parameters occurring after 1998. The total effect of the right-hand-side variables on the yield spread is the sum of the coefficients 1 and 1.
12
Data and Estimation
We analyse the spreads of foreign currency-denominated central government bond issues of 13 European countries and sub-central governments of Germany, Spain and Canada between 1991 and the beginning of 2005. The data are provided by Capital Data Bondware, now part of Dealogic Group. 13 As documented in Bernoth et al (2006) , the majority of foreign-currency bond issues by EU governments prior to 1999 were in either DM or USD. We use euro-denominated instead of DM-denominated issues after the beginning of EMU in 1999, as German federal government bonds continue to be the benchmark bond in the euro bond market. We use US treasury bonds and Canadian central government bonds as the benchmark bonds in the other two markets. We selected all issues for which Capital Data Bondware reports an appropriate benchmark yield. The yield spread is measured in basis points and is based on the difference in the yield to maturity at the time of issue between the national bond under consideration and a benchmark bond with the same maturity and coupon payment structure. 14 We rely entirely on Capital Data Bondware to identify the appropriate benchmark security. This implies that our sample does not include all foreign currency (and euro) issues by the sample governments during the period under consideration. It assures, however, that we do not introduce mistakes by trying to identify benchmarks ourselves.
12 Canzoneri et al. (2002) argue that is it important to condition on the stance of monetary policy when estimating the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates, as monetary policy might react to fiscal policy. Our use of yield spreads on foreign currency issues makes this point less relevant, as it seems much less likely that the central bank of the currency of issue would react to the fiscal policy of a different country. The ECB has often stated that it does not react to the fiscal policies of individual EMU member states. In view of this, we do not include a measure of the monetary policy stance in the model. 13 The precise starting and final year of the data differs per country/region depending on availability of budgetary data. 14 Capital Data Bondware defines equivalence as meaning that the benchmark bond is similar to the government bond under consideration with respect to the time of issuance, the coupon payment structure, the underlying currency, and the time to maturity.
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March 2008 The number of bond issues under consideration, sorted by issuing party and by currency of issuance, is reported in Pre-testing estimates of equation (4) for DM/Euro, USD, and Can$ issues separately show that we can pool the data for the former two markets, as the slope coefficients from these estimates were not significantly different. This is similar to the results in Bernoth et al (2006) . In contrast, we have to estimate the model for yield differentials in the Can$ market separately. In the model for Can$ issues, we drop the EMU related terms. We use OLS for the estimation and include time fixed effects to capture the impact of common trends, business cycles and other unobserved factors. of default and the expected repayment in case of partial default, and that the latter could still be relatively large; see equation (1).
Empirical Results
Since the size of the individual issue did not appear significantly in the regressions, we do not report the coefficients on this variable. Thus, we cannot account for liquidity premiums explicitly. Table 3 also shows that adding a year to the maturity of a bond relative to the benchmark raises the yield spread by almost one basis point. We find significant effects of international risk aversion as reflected by the corporate spread variable only in the USD-denominated market. This is consistent with a similar finding in Bernoth et al. (2006) . Similarly, we find that the monetary policy stance in the benchmark country as reflected in the short-term interest rate has a significant effect only in the USD-denominated market. Neither the constant nor the dummy for USDdenominated issues are statistically significant.
The table shows that the coefficient on the EMU-dummy is negative, pointing to a small, general reduction in yield spreads compared to the DM-denominated market, but it is not statistically significant. However, the slope parameters for central government debt and the budget balance change significantly with the start of EMU. This is indicated by the coefficients on the terms interacting the EMU dummy with the fiscal variables.
The effect of the debt ratio on the yield spread almost disappears with the introduction of the euro. The effect of the general government balance on the yield spread becomes significantly smaller. As noted above, this may be due to the more favourable risk profile of euro-denominated debt compared to foreign currency debt and does not necessarily reflect bail-out expectations in EMU.
Column B in Table 3 repeats the same estimate dropping the insignificant terms involving the corporate spread, the short-term interest rate, and the dummy for USDdenominated issues. The results are unchanged. A Wald test of the hypothesis that the sum of the slope coefficients on the government debt ratio is zero is not rejected. We report this and the following tests in Table 4 . Accordingly, the effect of the debt ratio on risk premiums disappears in the euro-denominated market. In contrast, a Wald test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the central government balance is zero is rejected, see Table 4 . Assuming that the expected repayment rate, , in case of partial default is unchanged, this suggests that markets price fiscal risk less than before the start of EMU, but still in a statistically significant way. An EU government running a deficit of one percent in excess of Germany's deficit saves roughly 2 basis points in the interest payment on its debt since the start of EMU.
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In column C, we report the estimate of the same model adding Spanish and Table 3 remain unchanged compared to column B, indicating that adding the subcentral government bonds does not change the previously discussed results concerning maturity,, global risk aversion, and the stance of monetary policy in the USDdenominated market. Table 4 indicates that the parameter tests regarding the debt and fiscal balance ratios of central governments remain unchanged. This table also shows that the sum of the coefficients on the balance ratio and the balance ratio interacted with the dummy for German State is not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the sum of the slope coefficients on budget balances for German States with and without EMU is not statistically different from zero. Taken together, these results indicate, first, that German
States had a privileged position in the debt market before the start of EMU, in that they paid no premium related to any differences between their fiscal balances at all. Markets seem to have paid no attention to the soundness of their fiscal positions. This is consistent with the hypothesis that markets expected State governments to be bailed out by the Federal government in the case of a fiscal crisis. Furthermore, our results indicate that this expectation vanished after the introduction of the euro. As the German Federal government is now restricted in its ability to issue debt due to the fiscal framework of EMU, markets may perceive that bailouts have become unlikely.
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March 2008 Next, we ask whether a state's position in Germany's fiscal equalization system affects the markets' bailout expectations. Specifically, we ask whether States that are consistently net recipients of the Federal equalisation system are treated differently compared to those that are consistently net contributors. For this purpose, consider columns E and F in Table 3 , where we differentiate between net contributors and net recipients. The table shows that, for net contributing states, the slope coefficient on the budget balance is only weakly significantly positive before the start of EMU and not significantly different from zero thereafter. For net recipient states, in contrast, both slope coefficients are highly significant and the pattern detected in column C is confirmed. We conclude that the special treatment before the start of EMU was indeed reserved for states which are net recipients.
To investigate the effects of fiscal equalization on risk premiums further, we now turn to the other large federation in our sample with an explicit equalization scheme, Canada. Table 5 reports the results for Canadian provinces. Lacking Canadian data for provincial gross debt that are comparable to those for European (sub-national) governments, we use two alternative definitions of government debt for the Canadian federal and provincial governments, namely total securities outstanding (columns A, C, and D) and total gross liabilities (columns B, E, and F). The latter includes nonsecuritized debt such as bank loans. Columns A and B use debt and deficits relative to the federal government as explanatory variables together with the corporate spread and the time to maturity. The positive and significant coefficients on the debt ratio suggest that Canadian provinces pay a risk premium of approximately 0.30 basis points for every percentage point their debt ratios increase relative to the federal government's debt ratio. The significant and negative coefficients on the balance ratio indicate that the risk premium also responds positively to an increase in the deficit relative to the federal government. As in the European case, the risk premium responds significantly to changes in investors' risk aversion as reflected in the corporate bond spread. Finally, premiums increase with longer maturities, but the effect is not statistically significant.
These results are broadly consistent with Booth et al. (2007) . 16 Using total gross liabilities as the debt variable yields similar results and a slightly higher R-squared.
Canadian fiscal equalization is characterized by the fact that the three largest provinces, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, never receive equalization grants,
March 2008 while the others, Manitoba, New Foundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, always do (see Table A1 ). During the 1990s, equalization grants on average amounted to about 14 percent of the receiving provinces' own revenues, but to 49 percent for New Foundland. 17 Among the receiving provinces, there is a group of small ones consisting of New Foundland, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia, and a group of medium-sized ones, i.e., Manitoba, Quebec, and Saskatchewan.
To see how the position in fiscal equalization affects the risk premium, column C adds intercept and interactive slope dummies for these two groups of receiving provinces. A first result from this is that the coefficient on the debt ratio loses statistical significance. It even obtains a negative sign when we use total debt outstanding as the measure of indebtedness. This suggests a strong correlation between the dummy for small and medium-sized recipient provinces and the debt ratio. In fact, a regression of the debt ratio on a constant and a dummy each for the two groups shows a strongly significant, positive relationship, see Table 6 . The coefficients in this regression give the average debt ratios for these three groups in the sample, i.e., small and medium-sized recipient provinces and large, non-recipient provinces. The left panel of the table shows that small provinces have the largest debt ratios, followed by medium-sized provinces and large provinces. The right panel of the table shows that a similar statistically significant correlation between provincial size and the fiscal balance ratios does not exist.
While the debt ratio thus loses significance, the intercept dummy for small recipient provinces is positive and significant, showing that these provinces pay higher risk premiums than large provinces in Canada. The intercept dummy for the mediumsized recipient provinces is not significant. We interpret the intercept dummy for the small provinces as a liquidity premium on the debt issued by small provinces, since it is not related to fiscal performance. The interactive dummies for small and medium-sized provinces on the debt ratio are not statistically significant. In contrast, the interactive slope dummies on the fiscal balance ratios are positive for both groups of recipient provinces and highly statistically significant for the small recipient provinces. The coefficient for the medium-sized provinces is only marginally significant. Furthermore, they are of similar magnitude and of similar absolute value compared to the slope coefficient on the fiscal balance which now measures the effect of the fiscal balances on the risk premium paid by large provinces. A Chi-square test shows that the Null
March 2008 hypothesis that this slope coefficient coefficients and each coefficients of the interactive dummies on the fiscal balance sum to zero cannot be rejected. Thus, small and medium-sized provinces receiving equalization grants do not pay a risk premium on their debt related to their fiscal performance relative to the Canadian government.
Column C also shows that a dummy variable for Quebec, included to reflect financial markets' assessment of a pursuit for more autonomy, is not statistically significant.
Hence, we drop it together with the interactive dummy on the debt ratio as we move from column C to column D. Column D also restricts the interactive dummy on the fiscal balance to be the same for small and medium-sized recipient provinces. Column E uses 
Conclusions
This paper extends recent empirical work on sovereign risk premiums in
European bond markets to sub-national governments in Germany, Spain, and Canada.
We find that yield spreads over appropriate benchmark bonds depend significantly on indicators of fiscal performance. This is consistent with the notion of sovereign risk premiums for (partial) defaults. We find such risk premiums both before and after the start of EMU, although their nature and magnitude has changed somewhat. status has disappeared with EMU. Thus, monetary union has increased the market pressure for fiscal discipline on German states. We also consider the risk premium paid by Spanish provinces and find that they did not receive a similar, favourable treatment as German states before the start of EMU. Since then, markets treat them similarly to German states. These findings are also interesting from the perspective of fiscal institutions: The evidence presented in this paper supports the notion of credibility of the no-bailout clause in the EU Treaty while the bail out expectation for German States appears to have lost perceived importance.
Pursuing our investigation into the effects of fiscal equalization on risk premiums paid by lower-level governments, we estimate similar models for Canadian provinces.
Here, too, we find that the position of a provincial government in the fiscal equalization scheme makes a significant difference. Large Canadian provinces, which never receive equalization grants, are generally penalised for running large budget deficits. However, markets do not penalize provinces that consistently receive transfers under the Canadian fiscal equalization system for running large deficits. This suggests that markets expect the Canadian government to provide financial assistance to the governments of these provinces should a financial crisis occur, a result which is similar to our findings for German states before the start of EMU. The fact that large provinces have significantly lower debt levels than provinces receiving equalization grants provides prima-facie evidence that fiscal discipline as imposed by financial markets can be effective. Note: The first entry is the number of issues until December 1998, the second entry the number of issues after 1 January 1999. Note: The deficit and debt ratio variables are the differences of the deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratios of the issuer country/region and the benchmark country. The benchmark issuer is the central government of the country in whose currency the bond is issued, i.e., Germany, the US or Canada. A positive number implies that deficit ratios are lower (or surplus ratios higher) than that of the benchmark issuer, respectively that debt ratios are higher than that of the benchmark issuer. Note: Public debt measure is total gross liabilities. Stars (*, **, and ***) indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% significance levels 
